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Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and
the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision
Herbert Hovenkamp*
INTRODUCTION
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the
settlement of a patent infringement suit in which the patentee
of a branded pharmaceutical drug paid a large sum to a generic
infringer to stay out of the market could be illegal under the
antitrust laws.1 Further, courts assessing the antitrust
illegality of such agreements need not evaluate the patent’s
validity or infringement.2 Such settlements must be evaluated
under antitrust’s rule of reason, although application need not
require proof of everything that the long form rule of reason
traditionally demands.3
One surprising thing about Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion is its unexpected generality, in two important ways.
First, in addressing the “basic question,” Justice Breyer opened
his opinion with a story that had nothing explicitly to do with
pharmaceuticals, generic drugs, or the Hatch-Waxman Act that
has provoked numerous pay-for-delay settlements. Rather, it is
about Company A, who sues Company B for patent
infringement. Then they settle under terms in which Company
B, the defendant, agrees “not to produce the patented product
until the patent’s term expires,” and the patentee pays
Company B “many millions of dollars.”4 The Court
characterized the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, which the
Supreme Court reversed, as nothing more than a “particular
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1. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
2. Id. at 2230–31.
3. Id. at 2237–38.
4. Id. at 2227.
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reverse payment settlement.”5 The Court later acknowledged
that “[a]pparently most if not all reverse payment settlement
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug
regulation.”6 As noted below, this produced a sharp
disagreement with the dissent.7 The significance of this level of
generality should not be lost. The Court’s subsequent analysis
giving antitrust a much stronger voice in evaluating the
legality of patent settlements can apply to many of them, both
inside and outside the Hatch-Waxman context.
Second, Justice Breyer’s opinion took a very general route
in assessing the antitrust legality of pay-for-delay settlements,
and one which refused to subordinate antitrust concerns to
those of patent law, at least in areas where the Patent Act did
not explicitly authorize the conduct in question. The obvious
alternatives open to the Court were:
1. Any settlement, including one that involves pay-fordelay, is immune from antitrust attack if it is facially “within
the scope of the patent.”8 For example, if a patent has six years
remaining and the pay-for-delay exclusion agreement runs only
five years, then the payment is lawful because the patent
standing alone, if valid, would have kept the infringer out of
the market in any event. Under this approach the court may
not second guess the settlement by inquiring into the validity of
the patent or the defendant’s actual infringement; the
settlement itself shields these queries from the court, with a
possible exception for egregious situations involving obviously
invalid patents. That is, it creates an “almost unrebuttable
presumption of patent validity,” and thus “assumes away the
question being litigated in the underlying patent suit . . . .”9
This is the approach that many lower courts have taken,

5. Id. (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in FTC v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)).
6. Id. at 2227 (citing 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046,
at 338 (3d ed. 2012); Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for
Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004) (additional
citations omitted)).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 43–58.
8. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If [a patent
holder’s] actions are within the scope of the patent, they are not subject to
antitrust scrutiny . . . .”).
9. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012)
(rejecting the “scope of the patent” approach).
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including the Eleventh Circuit decision that the Supreme Court
reversed, and it is consistent with a long tradition of federal
judicial deference to settlements of patent infringement
disputes.10 Justice Breyer acknowledged a “general legal policy
favoring the settlement of disputes.”11
2. A settlement payment that seems very large in
proportion to anticipated litigation costs is a sign that
something is wrong with the patent. It is likely either invalid or
not infringed. This should be construed as an invitation to open
the question that courts traditionally avoid in challenges to
settlements. They should look more closely at the underlying
patent and the infringement action in order to determine
whether the settlement is really a good faith attempt to
manage litigation and business risk, given the general
uncertainty of patent infringement lawsuit outcomes. Or is this
simply an attempt to continue an unjustified stream of
monopoly profits, albeit with two firms sharing it rather than
one? Possibilities for this close look have included direct
judicial evaluation of the patent or perhaps a call for reexamination by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).12
3. A large settlement exclusion payment disproportionate
to litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust’s rule of
reason, without inquiry into whether the patent is actually
invalid or not infringed, and even if the settlement agreement
does not go “beyond the scope” of the patent’s nominal

10. FTC v. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (“[A] reverse payment settlement is
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”); see also In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d
Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304, 1308
(11th Cir. 2003). On judicial deference to patent settlements, see generally 12
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 2046. On the course taken by earlier decisions,
see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY &
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3a1(B) (2d ed.
Supp. 2012).
11. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (citing several decisions).
12. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION
93–96 (2012); Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 324–26 (2011).
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coverage. The plaintiff has the burden of showing both market
power and competitive harm.
4. Same as 3, except a large payment triggers a “quick
look,” or truncated antitrust analysis in which the plaintiff can
enjoy presumptions about market power or anticompetitive
effect. The defendant has the burden of defending against these
and showing offsetting defenses.
5. Pay-for-delay settlements are unlawful per se—that is,
the plaintiff need prove only that such an agreement exists;
power and anticompetitive effects need not be proven.
The Supreme Court chose the middle option, 3, but it made
clear that the plaintiff need not make a full scale rule of reason
showing, which traditionally requires definition of a relevant
market, detailed proof of market power, and specific
anticompetitive effects.13
Stripped of nonessential regulatory detail, the pay-fordelay issue looks like this: The Hatch-Waxman Act14 was
intended to streamline the introduction of “bioequivalent”
generic drugs upon expiration of a patent held by the pioneer
drug developer.15 “Bioequivalent” means that the generic drug
has the same active ingredients as the pioneer and can be
expected to perform in the same way. As a result, it is subject
to much less testing than the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) requires for new drugs.16 The Act permits a generic
manufacturer who believes that a pioneer drug is about to go
off patent or that existing patents are invalid to file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval
for its generic alternative.17 At that time, if the pioneer believes
otherwise, it may file a patent infringement lawsuit against the
generic.18 The FDA must then withhold approval pending

13. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.
14. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
15. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing
the generic to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, ‘speed[s] the
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market’ . . . .” (quoting Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012))).
16. See id.; Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
18. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity:
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947,
952 (2011).
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litigation of up to thirty months until the patent dispute is
resolved or settled.19 Once the generic wins the right to produce
and begins marketing, it has a 180-day period of exclusivity
during which no other generic may enter the market.20 During
that time the market is a duopoly, with only the pioneer and
the first generic as producers. However, a pay-for-delay
settlement will delay the generic’s commercial entry, and thus
the running of the exclusivity clock, for the duration of the
settlement agreement.21
Another significant thing about the Court’s decision is
that, notwithstanding sharp differences on the issue before it,
the Court unanimously agreed that “consumer welfare” rather
than total welfare is the goal of antitrust enforcement.22 In
general, consumer welfare looks at the welfare only of
consumers, refusing to offset producer benefits against
consumer harms. By contrast, total welfare looks at all welfare
effects and nets them out. For example, if a practice harms
consumers $3 million by higher prices but benefits producers
by $4 million, perhaps by lowering production costs, then total
welfare is larger even though consumers are worse off. The
majority’s opinion was driven by a framework that equated
harm with higher consumer prices, saying nothing about the
welfare of producers. However, even Chief Justice Roberts’
dissent (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) acknowledged
consumer welfare to be the goal: “The point of antitrust law is

19. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent observed that the parties in this case
had litigated three years before reaching their pay-for-delay settlement
agreement. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Because
the statute does not permit another generic to enter until litigation has run for
thirty months, however, there is little incentive for the parties to reach an
agreement earlier than that.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
21. The process is described briefly in Justice Breyer’s opinion. Actavis,
133 S. Ct. at 2228. For more detail and analysis, see 12 HOVENKAMP, supra
note 6, ¶ 2046c, at 340–41; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 18, at 956–58; C.
Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1583–86 (2006)
(describing the “statutory bounty” distinguishing first generic filers from
subsequent challengers); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley,
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1719, 1754–56 (2003).
22. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–35 (analyzing the consumer benefit
provided by patent settlements); id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer
welfare.”23
I.

IMPACT OF PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS ON
DRUG PRICES

A pay-for-delay settlement preserves the exclusive right
created by the patent but requires the patentee to share the
profits with the first generic filer. Under well-established
principles, the joint-maximizing rate of output and price for
this two-person cartel will be precisely the same as if the
monopoly were held by a single person;24 however, the size of
the payment to the generic is an indeterminate rent. The
arrangement is thus similar to a situation in which two firms
cartelize their market but one of them shuts down its plant
altogether while the other compensates it out of its monopoly
profits. Formally, consumer welfare remains the same as it
would be under continued monopoly production by a single
firm. Justice Breyer cited opinions to the effect that payments
to generic challengers to stay out often lead to generic profits
that are even higher than they would make if they had
litigated to a favorable result and started producing.25 That is
necessarily the case if one takes litigation risk to the generic
into account. That is, a generic would not accept such a
settlement unless its expected value was at least as great as
the expected value of production.
Pioneer drug prices may actually rise after a large reverse
payment settlement, depending on how the payment is
structured. A lump sum payment made up front is a sunk cost.
According to the standard economic literature, sunk costs have
no impact on price.26 They are fixed costs, irreversible and
made in the past.27 By contrast, prices are determined by
reasonably anticipated marginal costs, which are a function of

23. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 4.1–4.2, at 158–78 (4th ed. 2011).
25. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra
note 21, at 1581); see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34
RAND J. ECON. 391, 408 (2003).
26. See, e.g., LUKE M. FROEB ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 26 (3d ed.
2014) (“Because [sunk] costs do not vary with decisions about changing
output, they should be ignored in decisions about output changes.”).
27. See id.
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variable costs.28 The empirical literature largely disagrees,
however, finding that most firms account for sunk costs in ways
that include them in variable costs, and thus makes them
relevant to pricing.29 In any event, to the extent that the
pioneer amortizes overhead, or if the pay-for-delay settlement
has some variable cost characteristics (such as varying with
sales volume), then the settlement might actually be calculated
into the pioneer’s short-run costs and serve to increase its
profit-maximizing price for the drug. Because the demand
curve facing the pioneer is downward sloping, its price will rise
as these costs rise. That result would be truly perverse, given
the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman legislation, but price
increases are clearly a possibility in some situations.
In contrast, if the patent is declared invalid and generic
entry occurs, two things will happen. First, the market will
have two independent producers. Second, the period of
exclusivity will be no longer than the 180 days following the
generic’s market entry, after which additional generics can
come in as well.
How the market reacts to actual generic entry depends on
how the two firms behave. At one extreme, they might enter
into a cartel agreement, leaving price and output as they were
prior to entry. However, this agreement could not hide behind a
patent settlement and would be naked price-fixing, perhaps
even a criminal offense. At the other extreme, the generic
might immediately begin charging a competitive price, which
could be much lower than the pioneer’s price, given its lower
development costs. In an undifferentiated market the pioneer
would have to respond with price cuts as well and the market
could move quickly to the competitive level.
In fact, pioneers do not always cut price in response to
generic entry and in some cases even increase it, finding it
more profitable to serve a small group of brand-sensitive
customers at a higher price.30 That is to say, notwithstanding

28. See, e.g., id. at 62–63.
29. See Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, The Sunk
Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices (Oct. 25, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=825986 (summarizing and accounting for the literature).
30. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 9 (2002) [hereinafter FTC STUDY], available at www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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that generics are bioequivalent, post-entry markets sometimes
reveal characteristics of product differentiation, namely,
specific consumer brand preferences and differential pricing. To
the extent that the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, or some
other intermediary creates additional incentives for generic
use, these effects may be mitigated.
In intermediate cases the two firms might reach a tacit
understanding about output or behave in other ways consistent
with their position as duopolists, as well as their expectations
about additional entry when the exclusivity period has expired.
In these cases prices would very likely begin to come down, but
how much and how quickly would depend on the
circumstances.31 In general, retail prices for generic drugs run
about 75% lower than for branded drugs.32
II. SIZE OF PAYMENT AND RISK
The size of the payment for delay can be relevant in
several ways. First, it signals the degree of doubt about the
underlying patent dispute. To illustrate, a landowner with a
clear title does not ordinarily pay a trespasser large amounts of
money to stay off her property. This has nothing to do with the
number of alternative trespassers out there, but results from
the fact that land title records are good, generally reliable, and
thus expose the landowner to minimal risk. A very large
payment from the landowner to the trespasser to stay off the
land is thus an irrational act unless it reflects significant
doubts about the quality of the title.
While patents also confer “title” over their exclusionary
power, clarity is more elusive. First, although patents on
pioneer molecules, the “active” ingredient in most drugs, are
among the most robust in the patent system, most of the
questionable pay-for-delay settlements do not involve pioneer
molecules. Rather, they are “evergreened” or extension patents
for such secondary properties as new formulations, new

31. See Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement
Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 316 (2012) (concluding that a single generic
entrant prices at 70%–88% of the pioneer’s pre-entry price).
32. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON
MEDICARE’S PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 8–9 (2010), available at
http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11838/09-15prescriptiondrugs.pdf.
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delivery mechanisms, new types of treatment, and the like.33
That is, the patent is on something other than the primary
active ingredient. The failure rate of these patents is much
higher, and when generic challenges are litigated to completion
the generic prevails more than two-thirds of the time.34 Most of
the generic challenges are made to these secondary ingredient
patents.35 The Solvay Pharmaceutical patent for Androgel, at
issue in this case, is a likely illustration. The active ingredient,
synthetic testosterone, had been around since 1935, and the gel
delivery system that it incorporated had been commonly known
for decades.36
Payments whose size correlates with risk are essential to
entrepreneurial decision making. As risk increases the relative
size of the payoff must rise as well, or investment will not
occur. In most cases, however, entrepreneurial risk is private,
in the sense that the firm is risking the resources of its own
shareholders. In the Hatch-Waxman pay-for-delay setting,
however, what is being placed at risk is both the investment of
the pioneer and the welfare of consumers, and these two
interests pull in opposite directions. As the plaintiff’s chances
of winning its infringement case drops, from say 80% to 20%,
the plaintiff will be willing to pay much more to protect its
asset. But consumers represent an important externality. They
are not participants in this dispute, but they stand to lose the
benefits of competition that would otherwise have occurred.
The principal risk element in pay-for-delay cases is that the
33. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation
Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007).
34. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the
Supreme Court, 339 SCIENCE 1386, 1387 (Mar. 22, 2013); FTC STUDY, supra
note 30, at 16 (finding that generic applicants prevailed 73% of the time); see
also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1673
(2012) (permitting generics to challenge overly broad “use codes” that limited
the applications of designated drugs). This compares to a general invalidity
rate in the 40%–50% range for litigated patents. John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA
Q.J. 185, 194, 205–06 (1998).
35. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent
Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH
ECON. 327, 334 (2012); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do
Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 621
(2011).
36. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable
Relief ¶ 31, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00955-TWT (N.D. Ga.
May 28, 2009).
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patent will be declared invalid. So the more questionable the
patent—and thus the greater the likelihood that consumer
benefits will be lost—the more the pioneer will be willing to pay
to save it from challenge. As a result, the pay-for-delay
settlement takes a patent whose probability of validity is
relatively small, perhaps 35% or less, and turns it into a patent
whose effective probability becomes close to 100% for the
duration of the pay-for-delay settlement. This occurs by virtue
of the fact that during this period no third potential producer
may challenge the patent.37
Ironically, if the value of the patent were zero, because it is
clearly invalid, but courts were not able to examine it, then the
profit-maximizing solution for the pioneer and the first generic
would still be a pay-for-delay settlement, just as if the patent
were of higher quality. The size of the payment would vary
inversely with the patent’s perceived quality. One of the great
unanticipated problems with the Hatch-Waxman procedure is
that during the exclusivity period, the number of effective
challengers to the patent is reduced to one, and the settlement
effectively removes that one from the picture.38
In sum, the likelihood of a pay-for-delay settlement is not
driven by the likelihood that the patent will be found invalid,
although the size of the settlement will be. The generic’s
calculus depends on the size of anticipated profits under entry
as opposed to the value of the settlement. Even if the generic
believes there is a 100% likelihood that the patent will be found
invalid, it may still be more valuable for the generic to share
the monopoly returns with the pioneer patentee for the
duration of the settlement agreement, rather than produce in
competition with the pioneer. At the other extreme, the
patentee who believes the patent is certainly valid and

37. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
38. The exclusive period runs from the time the generic’s ANDA is filed
until thirty months after the patent infringement lawsuit is filed, or 180 days
after generic production. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(B)(iii)–(iv) (2012). Unlike
European Union (EU) law, the United States does not permit anyone to
challenge a patent; that right is limited mainly to those charged with
infringement or facing a realistic threat of an infringement claim. In this case
the Hatch-Waxman Act, by its own terms, prevents everyone except the
ANDA filer from infringing. On the European procedure, see Guidelines for
Examination, Part D—Guidelines for Opposition and Limitation/Revocation
Procedures, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/
html/guidelines/e/d.htm (last updated Sept. 16, 2013).
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infringed may be willing to pay little more than a nuisance fee
to avoid litigation costs, but any amount of uncertainty would
likely provoke at least a modest settlement.
In sum, the Hatch-Waxman litigation process invites the
parties to privatize and share a stream of monopoly profits
whose aggregate value does not depend on the validity of the
patent. The exclusivity period conferred by the statute sees to
that by preventing other generics from coming in even if the
patent is worthless. For example, if the patent confers an
exclusionary right worth $800 million over its remaining life,
the pioneer and the first generic can share that amount with a
suitably structured settlement, and the prohibition on outside
challenges will leave that number unaffected by the value of
the patent itself, which is effectively immune to challenge.
The one possible exception is a direct consumer action
attacking the settlement agreement.39 While the Supreme
Court did not explore such actions, its substantial revision of
the substantive law applies equally to private actions and it is
reasonable to expect that several will emerge. The K-Dur
decision in the Third Circuit permitted an action by direct
purchasing consumers.40 Following Actavis, the Supreme Court
vacated that decision insofar as it applied a “quick look” to the
restraint, but it did not address any limitations on private
plaintiff standing.41 Under Actavis, purchasers seeking
antitrust overcharge damages from an anticompetitive pay-fordelay settlement should be able to proceed without proving
patent invalidity, although they would be subject to the same
rule of reason constraints that the Court created for the FTC.
III. UBIQUITY OF PAY-FOR DELAY SETTLEMENTS
One important debate between the Actavis majority and
dissent concerned the ubiquity of pay-for-delay settlements.
Are such settlements a unique feature of the Hatch-Waxman

39. Cf. Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (permitting consumers to challenge allegedly unlawful patent
exclusion under antitrust laws).
40. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub
nom. Merck & Co., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013); see
also In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 691–92 (2d
Cir. 2009) (permitting a consumer challenge to an agreement between pioneer
and generic that allegedly inflated the price of the generic drug).
41. See Merck & Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2849.
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regime, suggesting that they are not particularly important to
the efficient functioning of the patent litigation system
generally? Or are they quite common in the general give-andtake of patent litigation settlements, although perhaps not
particularly well publicized? The question is hardly trivial,
given the majority’s conclusion that pay-for-delay patent
settlements can restrain trade and thus violate the antitrust
laws even if the patent is valid. The premise is that there are
better, less anticompetitive ways to settle these disputes,
including production licenses to the generic, and rule of reason
analysis includes a query into the availability of less restrictive
alternatives.42
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent took issue with the
majority’s conclusion that pay-for-delay settlements are
virtually unknown outside the Hatch-Waxman context.43 He
cited a law review article and the Respondent’s brief, which
had mentioned a few cases.44 The Chief Justice then suggested
that there might be “scores and scores” of such settlements, but
they are not well known because they are private agreements.45
None of the three cases that the respondents uncovered
involved patents. The MGM decision involved a trademark
dispute over the defendant’s use of “007” as a company and
product name, which Metro claimed was owned by its affiliates
as part of its James Bond 007 marks.46 The district court
refused to issue a preliminary injunction, and the parties then
settled under an arrangement in which Metro paid the
infringement defendant $150,000.47 In exchange the defendant
was permitted to continue to use “007” in its company name,
but not on specific products.48 The $150,000 was almost
certainly within litigation risks, particularly since the district

42. On the relevance of less restrictive alternatives to rule of reason
analysis, see 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1505b, at 417–19 (3d ed. 2010).
43. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing 1 HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY
& LESLIE, supra note 10, § 15.3, at 15-45 n.161 (2d ed. Supp. 2011)).
44. See id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Marc G.
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1046 (2004)).
45. Id.
46. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10 (1st
Cir. 1999).
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id.

2014]

ANTICOMPETITIVE PATENT SETTLEMENTS

15

Court had denied a preliminary injunction.49 In In Time
Products, the district court had also denied a preliminary
injunction on the plaintiff’s claims for copyright and trade dress
infringement committed by the defendant’s robot toys.50 At that
point the plaintiff agreed to purchase the defendant’s allegedly
infringing inventory for an amount of less than $200,000, plus
an additional $150,000 for the destruction of other inventory.51
Once again, these amounts seem to be within litigation risks,
and are practically trivial when compared with the multihundred-million dollar figures involved in some pay-for-delay
pharmaceutical patent settlements.
The only dispute cited by the respondents that produced a
larger settlement, $20 million, was between Microsoft and
Lindows.com, a company which made an open source Linuxbased operating system for computers with Windows
architecture.52 Microsoft alleged that “Lindows” was
confusingly similar to “Windows.”53 The background, which the
respondents did not recite, is worth noting. Microsoft had
already been denied a preliminary injunction twice, with the
second decision concluding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact whether the name “Windows” was generic and
thus could not have trademark protection.54 At the time of the
settlement the district court had already decided that the issue
of genericness should be given to a jury, but it then certified
that decision for interlocutory appeal.55 Previously the USPTO
had twice refused to register “Windows” as a trademark
because it believed the term to be generic, but then changed its
mind without explanation.56 In sum, at the time of the
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
In Time Prods., Ltd. v. Toy Biz, Inc., 38 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id.
See Douglas F. Gray, Microsoft Sues Lindows.com over Name, TECH
HIVE (Dec. 21, 2001, 8:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/77163/
article.html.
53. See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 54 n.20, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705, at *54 n.20; Joris Evers,
Microsoft, Lindows Make a Deal, TECH HIVE (July 19, 2004, 2:00 PM),
http://www.techhive.com/article/116947/article.html.
54. See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL
32085605, at *3–5 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2002).
55. See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2004 WL
329250 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2004).
56. See id.; Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002
WL 31499324 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2002).
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settlement Microsoft faced a serious threat that it would lose
its trademark on the “Windows” name. Twenty million dollars
was a small price to pay.
So, yes, there may be some reverse payment settlements
outside the Hatch-Waxman context.57 Further, Chief Justice
Roberts’ point that there could be many pay-for-delay patent
settlements out there that have not been disclosed is well
taken. Nevertheless, one would think that the interest groups
in this case, with significant resources and patent experience,
could have come up with more examples had they been there to
discover, and perhaps at least one that involved patents. Based
on this record, pay-for-delay seems to be predominantly if not
exclusively a feature of the Hatch-Waxman Act.58
IV. APPLYING ANTITRUST TO PAY-FOR-DELAY
SETTLEMENTS
A. PRE- VS. POST-ISSUANCE PRACTICES
The patent regime is characterized by active regulatory
scrutiny during the application and prosecution process, but
very little scrutiny once a patent has issued.59 Well-established
rules of implied antitrust immunity thus suggest that antitrust
has little place as a governor of the patent issuance process,60
but considerable room remains to apply antitrust to practices

57. The term “pay-for-delay” seems inappropriate here, since the
trademarks at issue in the discussed cases are of indefinite duration. These
settlements were very likely “permanent,” keeping the defendant out of the
market indefinitely.
58. Justice Breyer appropriately rejected a suggestion he attributed to the
dissent that the patentee who settles for something less than its initial
demand is effectively accepting a “reverse payment” for the balance. See
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233 (discussing Schildkraut, supra note 44, at 1046).
Justice Breyer referenced the patentee who demands $100 million for
infringement by a producing infringer and ends up settling for $40 million,
with the suggestion that this in fact amounts to a “reverse payment” of the
unpaid $60 million. Id. In any event, in this story the alleged infringer
actually produces rather than exiting from the market, and the size of the
license fee is irrelevant. Indeed, in the absence of any infringement litigation
whatsoever the patentee could lawfully accept any price it wished as a
licensing fee from a producer.
59. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 83–85.
60. See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶¶ 240–244 (4th ed. 2013).
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involving issued patents.61 Patents are property interests and
assets, and can be made subject to antitrust rules governing
mergers,62 price-fixing,63 tying,64 and other practices.
Obviously, settlements of patent infringement suits are postissuance practices. The one clear exception to this rule is
express immunity: if the Patent Act expressly authorizes a
specific practice, then that practice standing alone cannot
violate the more general antitrust laws.65
The general rule of judicial deference to settlements of
patent infringement suits rests mainly on a belief that, while
patents are property interests, they are plagued with validity
and boundary problems so severe that judges cannot have a
great deal of confidence in the courts.66 They must defer to the
parties’ reasonable, good faith assessments of likely outcomes
and risk. Significantly, however, in most settlements the
plaintiff and defendant have interests aligned against one
another and the settlement contemplates a production license.
As a result there is typically little reason for thinking that any
nonparticipating interest group is significantly injured by the
settlement and consumers typically benefit.67 By contrast, the
impact of Hatch-Waxman’s generic exclusivity provision is
61. Even the Supreme Court’s rule in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), involved, not the initial use of
false statements about prior sales to obtain a patent, but rather the postissuance assertion of a patent known to be invalid in an infringement suit. See
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 706 (3d ed.
2008). Under U.S. law, simply using fraud or inequitable conduct to obtain the
patent is disciplined through the Patent Act and USPTO procedures rather
than antitrust. See id. ¶ 706, at 255 (“As a general proposition, merely
obtaining a patent by fraud with no subsequent enforcement attempt, is not
an exclusionary practice under [antitrust law].”).
62. See 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1202f, at 273 (3d ed. 2009) (patents are “assets” subject to antitrust merger
laws).
63. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 315 (1948).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (prohibiting anticompetitive use of tying or
exclusive dealing in goods, “whether patented or unpatented”).
65. On express immunity, see 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 60,
¶ 243b, at 336–38.
66. Cf. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 21, at 1574 (“[A judicial
reflex in favor of settlement] may be unusually acute due to the highly
technical nature of pharmaceutical patent cases, which many federal judges
prefer to avoid.”).
67. The exceptions are situations where the settlement also contemplates
product price-fixing, market division, or some other restraint that may injure
consumers. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2046b4–2046b5.
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frequently to align the interests of both plaintiff and defendant
in favor of preserving exclusivity but sharing the proceeds,
contrary to the interests of consumers. In these cases, the size
of the settlement payment is undoubtedly a more reliable
indicator of the parties’ own assessment of likely litigation
outcomes than is any conclusion that can be drawn from the
fact of settlement itself.
As noted, outside the Hatch-Waxman context patent
infringement lawsuits are very frequently settled by
agreements that contemplate a license to the infringement
defendant, with a payment from it to the patentee rather than
vice-versa.68 Such licenses are expressly authorized by the
Patent Act, whether or not they are preceded by a dispute.69
Further, they ordinarily add one new producer into the market
and presumptively increase output. As a result they do not
frequently raise antitrust issues. Justice Breyer noted the
Supreme Court’s pooling arrangement in the Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana) case, which settled litigation by a broad cross-license
that permitted all parties to practice, but also warned that it
might not be so generous with agreements that threatened to
dominate the industry and curtail production.70
The traditional antitrust challenges to patent settlements
have generally been to collateral provisions, such as product
price-fixing between patentees and licensees,71 concerted
refusals directed at others,72 or some market division
agreements.73 While the Patent Act contemplates licensing and
actual production by others,74 it nowhere justifies reverse
payments to keep others out. This was relevant to Justice
Breyer’s query whether “‘the patent statute specifically gives a

68. See, e.g., Michael J. Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in
Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA 313, 315–16 (2009).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
70. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232–33 (citing Standard Oil Co.
(Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931)).
71. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 494 (1926) (upholding
license agreement between patentee and a single producing licensee that fixed
the latter’s product price); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70
(1902) (upholding patent pool that fixed product price).
72. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
73. E.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); cf.
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (applying per se rule to a
horizontal trademark license agreement with territorial division).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
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right’ to restrain competition in the manner challenged,”75 as
well as his critique of the dissent because it did “not identify
any patent statute that it understands to grant such a right [as
reverse payment settlements] to a patentee, whether expressly
or by fair implication.”76 He also noted that nothing in the
Hatch-Waxman Act could be read as approving pay-for-delay
settlements, but instead strongly indicated that its goal was to
increase competition by facilitating the entry of generic drugs.77
Closer antitrust scrutiny of practices that threaten
competitive harm but are not expressly authorized by the
Patent Act makes sense given the degree of producer influence
over the drafting of patent legislation.78 At least since the
passage of the 1952 Patent Act, the legislative drafting process
has largely reflected the wishes of business firms who have a
direct financial interest in the patent process. Consumer
interests are largely ignored, even though their interests are
most closely aligned with the general welfare. Consumers profit
from cost-justified innovation in product quality and variety, as
well as cost savings. By contrast, producer interests are much
more diverse and more frequently aligned with increased
protection for its own sake.79 This history has shown that
producer interests opposed to a particular judicial
interpretation of the Patent Act have been quite successful in
obtaining changes. This was true, for example, of the 1952
Patent Act, which was a reaction to what the Patent Bar
perceived as excessive Supreme Court hostility toward
patents.80 It was also true of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform

75. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Line Material
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310–11 (1948)).
76. Id. at 2233.
77. Id. at 2234.
78. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2200 (2000); Liza Vertinsky,
Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV.
501, 526 (2010) (“Indeed, the role of industry groups in influencing and even
drafting intellectual property legislation has been noted . . . .”).
79. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and
Intellectual Property Law, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L J., Autumn 2013, at 53,
61; Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 51, 52 n.2 (2010).
80. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW:
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at ch. 10 (forthcoming 2014); see
also Nard, supra note 79, at 72 (“The heart of the 1952 Act was a direct
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Act, which largely eliminated liability for patent tying in the
absence of market power, as well as unilateral refusals to
deal.81 If these interests believe that reverse payment
settlements ought to have statutory approval, they are in the
best position to obtain new legislation. As a result, there is
much to be said for a judicial practice of looking at the
challenged restraint to see if it poses a significant risk of
competitive harm and then deferring to patent law only when
the challenged practice is explicitly approved by the statute.
B. RELEVANCE OF PATENT INVALIDITY OR NONINFRINGEMENT
As noted above, Justice Breyer’s decision contemplated
that a court could invalidate a pay-for delay settlement without
digging into questions about validity or infringement.82 That
conclusion will very likely be one of the more controversial
parts of his opinion, but it is consistent with the FTC’s long
held position. Justice Breyer also noted that, very likely in this
case, the settlement’s “anticompetitive effects fall within the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”83 However,
this fact was insufficient to “immunize the agreement from
antitrust attack.”84
On the question of judicial obligation to consider patent
validity, the Court wrote:
[I]t is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer
the antitrust question . . . . An unexplained large reverse payment
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts
about the patent’s survival . . . . In a word, the size of the
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.85

Later the Court reiterated that, although it was requiring
a rule of reason treatment with the burden of proof generally
on the plaintiff, this did not require the FTC to “litigate the
patent’s validity, empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices

response to the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence over the previous
several years.”).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Christina
Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 487–88 (2012).
82. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
83. Id. at 2230.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2236–37 (emphasis added) (citing 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6,
¶ 2046, at 350–52).
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of the patent system, present every possible supporting factor
or refute every possible pro-defense theory.”86 This entails that
patent validity is not a separate consideration for either the
plaintiff’s case or the defense. Both would require litigation of
the patent’s validity.
In one sense, the size of the payment operates as a
surrogate for direct patent-law-based questions about patent
quality. Indeed, payment size may actually be a more reliable
indicator to the extent it reflects the settling parties’ marketbased judgment about the patent’s probable prospects in a fully
litigated infringement suit. Data on claim construction error
rates,87 the high percentage of litigated patents found to be
invalid, and high reversal rates,88 all suggest that the size of
the payment may in fact be at least as good a tool for assessing
patent quality as a direct look at the patent itself. This is most
likely to be the case where the pay-for-delay settlement is on
something other than the patent’s active ingredient, as in
Actavis itself.89
Beyond that, however, patent validity does not answer the
antitrust question, which is whether a settlement of a
particular type restrains trade unreasonably. As the majority
observed:
The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment.
But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely

86. Id. at 2237–38 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780
(1999) (quoting 7 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1507, at 402 (1st ed. 1986))).
87. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223,
246 (2008) (finding district court error rates in claim construction ranging
from 25%–50%, depending on definitions used); see also J. Jonas Anderson &
Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and Normative
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150360.
88. Allison & Lemley, supra note 34; see also Ted L. Field, “Juridical
Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV.
721, 723 (2012) (finding the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates to be greater than
other circuits studied). On district-specific reversal rates, see Teresa Lii,
Shopping for Reversals: How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Litigation
Forums, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 31, 43 (2013) (looking at many district
courts and finding a weighted average reversal rate of 37.8%).
89. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that
consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.90

Further, it would be:
[I]ncongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the
settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy,
rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust
policies as well. And indeed, contrary to the Circuit’s view that the
only
pertinent
question
is
whether
“the
settlement
agreement . . . fall[s] within” the legitimate “scope” of the patent’s
“exclusionary potential,” this Court has indicated that patent and
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the “scope of the
patent monopoly”—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that
is conferred by a patent.91

A striking part of Justice Breyer’s discussion of Supreme
Court precedent was its showing that restraints involving
patents whose validity or coverage was not in dispute could
nevertheless run afoul of the Sherman Act, even outside of the
Hatch-Waxman context.92 In the process he gave the narrowest
interpretation of the oft-criticized 1926 General Electric rule
that the Supreme Court has ever stated, declaring that it
“permitted a single patentee to grant to a single licensee a
license containing a minimum resale price requirement.”93 The
statement appears implicitly to overrule the Supreme Court’s
Bement decision, which permitted product price-fixing among
the numerous members of a patent pool.94
C. THE RULE OF REASON FOR REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rejected the Federal
Trade Commission’s position in one significant respect: he
declined to apply any kind of “quick look” analysis that granted
the Commission a presumption of illegality. At the same time,
however, the Court made clear that a “long form” rule of reason
was not necessary either.

90. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
91. Id. at 2231 (internal citation omitted).
92. See, e.g., id. at 2231 (“[C]ourts must ‘balance the privileges of [the
patent holder] and its licensees under the patent grants with the prohibitions
of the Sherman Act against combinations and attempts to monopolize.’”
(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–91 (1948))).
93. Id. at 2232 (discussing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,
489 (1926)). A few lower courts had adopted this formulation. See 12
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 2041b.
94. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
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In general, analysis of a contractual restraint under the
rule of reason requires a showing of (1) power sufficient to
warrant a conclusion of plausible competitive harm; (2) a
restraint that threatens to reduce output or increase price and
that (3) is not justified by efficiencies or some other redeeming
virtue.95 Without departing from any of these principles, the
majority’s opinion in Actavis permitted trial courts to
“structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand,
the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper
analysis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible fact
or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed . . . .”96
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
historical reluctance to adopt any kind of bipolar distinction
between a full “rule of reason” on one hand and a drastically
abbreviated “quick look” on the other. Rather, the analysis is
situational and requires the court to consider factors relevant
to the question at hand and to create presumptions based on its
estimate of likelihood of proof.97 The Court observed that
“[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in appraising
reasonableness,” and that “the quality of proof required should
vary with the circumstances.”98
The majority’s reasoning reflects the view that the various
modes of antitrust analysis actually manage two variables at
the same time. One variable is burdens of proof and
presumptions, while the other has to do with the kind of
evidence needed to carry one’s burden. The per se rule weighs
both variables strongly in the plaintiff’s favor once per se
conduct is shown. The “quick look,” as the FTC has formulated
it, also created presumptions of power and harm in the
plaintiff’s favor. By contrast, what the Actavis majority stated
was that the presumptions continue to lie with the defendant,
thus giving the plaintiff the burden of proof.99 However, the
nature of the evidence needed to carry one’s burden can also
vary with the circumstances. Here the Court was clear that
more abbreviated proof than ordinarily attends the full rule of

95. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, ¶ 1502, at 389.
96. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
97. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, ¶¶ 1507, 1508c.
98. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (quoting 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 86, ¶ 1507,
at 402) (internal punctuation omitted)).
99. Id. at 2237.
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reason was available for both power and anticompetitive
effects.
On power, the Court suggested that the “size of the
payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective
generic is itself a strong indicator of power.”100 That
observation, which should dispense with any requirement of a
relevant market definition, seems beyond dispute for very large
payments. In a competitive market the value of keeping a
competitor out is close to zero, but becomes higher as price-cost
margins increase. Further, in these cases the duration of the
monopoly is not infinite, but is limited by the remaining
duration of the patent. A rational patentee would pay no more
than the anticipated value of monopoly returns over the
remaining period, so a large payment surely indicates power.
Indeed, this form of more “direct” measurement is probably as
good as or better than traditional market definition
approaches.101
One complaint about using a large payment as proof of
power is that it ignores the high fixed costs of pioneer product
development, which may require prices above short-run
marginal costs so that fixed costs can be recovered. That
argument misses Justice Breyer’s point, however. First, the
fixed cost critique applies to one degree or another to all of our
mechanisms for assessing power, including the Lerner Index
and its many derivations,102 as well as even orthodox market
delineation through the methodology of assuming a price
increase to supracompetitive levels.103 In every case, high fixed
costs tend to result in conclusions of greater market power or
smaller markets, which is the same thing. Second, long-run
ability to earn a profit is not the concern of antitrust market
power assessment in any event. Fixed costs are one of the many
risks that a firm undertakes, and they do so in a regime in
which there is no defense to price-fixing, naked market
division, or exclusionary practices on the theory that the
practice is necessary to keep price/cost margins sufficiently

100. Id. at 2236 (quoting 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 2046, at 351).
101. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOW & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 515, 521 (3d ed. 2007) (describing price-cost margins in
¶ 515 and direct measures based on demand elasticities in ¶ 521).
102. 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 520e (4th ed. forthcoming 2014).
103. Id. ¶¶ 536–539.
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high to enable it to recover its investment. Even if we believed
that a firm is entitled to use a collusive practice in order to
obtain a margin sufficiently high to cover its fixed cost
investment, this would not entail that it is entitled to recover
the full monopoly profits available from that market.
This latter point should not be lost because it explains why
high fixed costs do not provide a general defense to collusion,
whether in the Hatch-Waxman context or elsewhere. The
amount of margin a firm needs to recover its fixed costs is a
function of the magnitude of those costs and of aggregate pricecost margins during the recovery period. By contrast, the
monopoly price is a function of costs and market demand, and
that number can be far, far higher. For example, a firm with
marginal costs of eight dollars and high fixed costs may need a
price of ten dollars in order to recover its fixed-cost investment.
The monopoly price in that market might be fifteen dollars,
depending on demand. Permitting collusion or market division
without antitrust scrutiny allows the firm to earn the full
monopoly markup.
The rule of reason requires not only proof of power, but
also of competitive harm, of which higher consumer prices or
reduced output are the clearest types. Here, the Court noted
that the size of the payment was also an indicator of
competitive harm.104 A large payment would be an irrational
act unless the patentee believed that generic production would
cut into its profits. Here, “the likelihood of a reverse payment
bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation
costs, its independence from other services for which it might
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing
justification.”105
The Court also noted that sometimes the agreements could
have “redeeming virtues,” although the list Justice Breyer
provided was not long.106 It included the observation that some
settlements may constitute little more “than a rough
approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the
settlement.”107 In other cases the payment may constitute

104.
105.
106.
107.

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
Id. at 2237.
Id. at 2236.
Id.
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“compensation for other services” that the generic might
perform, including distribution or market development.108
Adequate proof would be required.
Interests aligned with the drug companies were critical of
the decision, suggesting that it will create uncertainty and
discourage innovation.109 But that seems unlikely. First, a
sensibly applied rule of reason as the Supreme Court majority
outlined need not be complex, certainly not when compared to
the general run of FTC antitrust cases. Very large payments
shielding very weak patents from outsider scrutiny will occur
much less frequently, but that is how it should be.
Pharmaceutical developers will continue to have strong
protection for primary patents on active ingredients, but
weakened protection for secondary patents in areas where fully
litigated invalidity rates are very high. Intermediate cases are
more likely to be litigated to a validity decision or else settle by
more traditional methods, including production licenses to
generic infringement defendants or an agreement to delay
entry but without any compensation to the generic.
One important feature of traditional settlements such as
production licenses is that they reflect adversity between the
parties.110 The patentee wants to obtain as high a production
royalty as possible and the infringement defendant wants to
pay as little. The same thing is generally true of agreements
delaying entry but without anything of value changing hands.
Suppose that the pioneer simply agrees with the generic that
the generic can enter several years from now and nothing of
value changes hands. In that case the generic will want to
make the delay as short as possible, while the pioneer will
want to make it longer, and the parties have sufficient
adversity to give us some confidence that a realistic assessment
of the strength of the patent is included in their calculus. By
contrast, the pay-for-delay settlement permits the parties to
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., PhRMA Statement on Supreme Court Ruling in Patent
Settlement Case, PHRMA (June 17, 2013), http://phrma.org/phrma-statementon-supreme-court-ruling-in-patent-settlement-case.
110. See U.S. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.3 (1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (speaking of procompetitive benefits of
licensing); cf. Adam Hemlock & Jennifer Wu, U.S. Antitrust Implications of
Patent Licensing, 52 FED. LAW., June 2005, at 39, 40 (“Patent licensing can
have significant potential benefits that promote competition.”).
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share the full monopoly overcharge, giving each of them an
expected value greater than the probable value of the patent in
question.
D. ADMINISTRABILITY
The majority and the dissent stated starkly different views
about administrability of an antitrust rule governing pay-fordelay patent settlements. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court
that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible
administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.”111 In
contrast, Chief Justice Roberts declared that he would “not
subject basic questions of patent law to an unbounded inquiry
under antitrust law, with its treble damages and famously
burdensome discovery . . . .”112
Of course, the simplest rule is no rule at all, and in that
sense the Chief Justice is correct. On the other hand, the
analytic approach that the majority developed is actually at the
simpler range of antitrust doctrine, and certainly not as
complex as a regime that would require a court to assess patent
validity or weigh the impact of the settlement agreement on
incentives to innovate. The pay-for-delay agreements in
question are written and detailed, so proof of an agreement and
its content is typically not in issue. Determining whether the
agreement is unreasonably large in comparison with litigation
costs should not prove burdensome either, because such data
are kept and reported. The dissent cited one study indicating a
number in the range of $10 million per lawsuit, somewhat
higher than the cost of patent litigation generally.113 A good
approach would be to start with a presumptive number of
about that size, letting the parties dispute whether special
factors in their case justify a number that is higher or lower.
Determining the market value of any services actually
rendered by the generic should not be complex either, given
111. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. On how the lower courts should
administer pay-for-delay antitrust challenges in the future, see Aaron Edlin,
Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16.
112. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2247 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2243–44 (citing Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma:
Examining Brand and Generic Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1795 n.41
(2011)); cf. 1 HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY & LESLIE, supra note 10, § 7.1c, at 5
n.6 (indicating $1.5 million per side in legal fees).
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that these services are routinely sold in a broad market. The
court needs to ensure mainly that the services are being priced
at the reasonable market value of what is actually provided.
For example, if general distributors are providing services of a
certain kind for fifty cents per package, that number should
serve as a benchmark for pricing of services in a settlement.
The most difficult part of such cases—determining the validity
of the patent—was made unnecessary by the Court’s antitrustcentric approach.
CONCLUSION
The dissent suggested that a “patent carves out an
exception to the applicability of antitrust laws.”114 Given the
high degree of federal regulatory supervision over the patent
granting process, a regulatory exception for most pre-issuance
conduct before the USPTO is in order. But once a patent issues
it is largely an unregulated asset capable of both efficient and
harmful use, just as any other business property.
The dissent also posited what appears to be a false
dichotomy: “We have never held that it violates the antitrust
law for a competitor to refrain from challenging a patent. And
by extension, we have long recognized that the settlement of
patent litigation does not by itself violate the antitrust laws.”115
Of course, unilateral failure to enter a market, whether by
challenging a patent or otherwise, is virtually never an
antitrust violation, while an agreement that one party will not
enter clearly can be.116 The case that Chief Justice Roberts
cited for the proposition that settlements do not violate the
antitrust laws was Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), where the
settlement involved cross-licensing and actual production by all
of the parties.117
The dissent also suggested that routinely approved
settlements have included “licenses that fix prices, or
agreements among competitors to divide territory.”118 The
114. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
115. Id. at 2239.
116. This was the principle issue in Twombly, where the fact of non-entry
was clear, and antitrust liability turned on whether the non-entry was the
consequence of a unilateral decision of an agreement. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
117. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931).
118. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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record is in fact more mixed. Assuming that the Chief Justice
was talking about product price-fixing rather than merely an
agreement about the royalty rate of a negotiated license, then
price-fixing is hardly routinely approved, save for the infamous
“GE exception” discussed above.119 Territorial division
agreements are usually lawful, but that is because the Patent
Act contains an express provision authorizing patentees to
stipulate territories in their license agreements, at least within
the United States.120 The dissent’s statement that “a patent
holder acting within the scope of its patent does not engage in
any unlawful anticompetitive behavior”121 seems difficult to
square with the routine application of section 7 of the Clayton
Act to asset acquisitions of patents,122 notwithstanding that the
Patent Act expressly permits assignments.123 Implicitly, then,
it permits only assignments that are not found to be
anticompetitive. The same thing is true of patent tying
arrangements, which the Patent Act expressly shelters, but
only if the patentee lacks market power;124 otherwise they are
subject to routine antitrust analysis.
On pay-for-delay itself, the Supreme Court’s decision was
broad and clear, but it is also important for what it said about
other cases. One theme that Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
repeated is that extra antitrust deference is due to patent
practices challenged under the Sherman Act when the practice
is either expressly authorized by the Patent Act or is there “by
fair implication.”125 When that is not the case, antitrust should
be given greater rein. The Actavis decision thus invites the
courts to consider the permissible scope of anticompetitive
patent licensing, including restraints that settle disputes and
those resulting from ordinary business transactions. Of these,
pay-for-delay settlements are an important but hardly the only
part.

119. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing United
States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926)).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (permitting assignments or
licenses covering “the whole or any specified part of the United States”).
121. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2240.
122. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
124. Id. § 271(d).
125. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233.
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